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WHY NOT HEROIN? THE CONTROVERSY




"Right now, in America, we know of a drug which is the most potent,
effective, soluble, and rapidly active narcotic ever created. It is not available.
I do not understand this."'
A noted oncologist testified before a House Subcommittee to encourage
the legalization of heroin for the purpose of easing the pain experienced by
many terminally ill cancer victims.' The issue is an emotionally charged one
in which medical, legal, ethical, personal, and societal values collide. Propo-
nents of limited legalization of heroin are led by the relatives of cancer vic-
tims and their legal and medical advocates.3 Among them are many
distinguished members of the medical and research communities who main-
tain that heroin is the most soluble and potent narcotic for pain relief,4 that
it clearly works for some patients for whom all else fails,5 and that its thera-
peutic use presents no appreciable risk to the community.
6
Legal advocates of heroin's therapeutic use contend that the judicially rec-
ognized constitutional right of privacy extends to the relevant medical deci-
1. The Compassionate Pain Relief Act; Hearings on H.R. 4762, Before the Subcommittee
on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 550 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
2. Dr. Mondzac has been an oncologist for fifteen years, chairs the Cancer Committee of
the D.C. Medical Society, serves as Clinical Associate Professor of Medicine at George Wash-
ington University, and is a member of the board of Directors of the National Committee on the
Treatment of Intractable Pain. Hearings, supra note 1, at 546.
3. The National Committee on the Treatment of Intractable Pain (NCTIP) is an advo-
cacy group formed in 1977 to lobby for congressional action to legalize heroin for limited
therapeutic use. Its members and Board include medical and legal professionals as well as
families of cancer victims. The organization has 6,000 members. National Committee on the
Treatment of Intractable Pain, P.O. Box 9553, Friendship Station, Washington, D.C. 20016
(301) 983-1710. Judith H. Quattlebaum, President.
4. Hearings, supra note 1, at 555. See also Mattingly & Conley, The Medical Prescription
of Heroin for Terminal Cancer Patients, 9 LAW. MED. J. 337 (1981).
5. Shapiro, The Right of Privacy and Heroin Use for Painkilling Purposes by the Termi-
nzally Ill Cancer Patient, 21 ARIz. L. REV. 41, 42-48 (1979). See also Neal, Why Can't the
Dying Have Heroin? NEW YORK, Oct 2, 1978, at 76, 79.
6. Hearings, supra note r, at 550.
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sion,7 that the prohibition of heroin for therapeutic purposes represents a
deprivation of due process for cancer victims,8 and that, in some instances,
the common law defense of necessity justifies the use of illicit drugs.9
Opponents are equally vocal. They include the institutional regulators of
licit and illicit drugs: the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
and its specialized arm, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), which is responsible for catego-
rizing drugs into one of five levels of abuse potential.'" Upon recommenda-
tion from HHS, the DEA scheduled heroin into Schedule I. This is the most
restrictive class, and prohibits all use except for closely controlled research.
Official government sources now maintain that heroin is not preferable to
morphine for pain relief" and that the advent of new synthetic narcotics
makes the heroin issue moot.' 2 Representatives of the medical profession,
including the American Medical Association, report that more efficacious
drugs exist for the same purpose and that ineffective pain management tech-
niques are the problem for cancer patients, rather than the prohibition of a
pain-killing drug. 3 Finally, law enforcement officials as well as pharmacists
and many citizens are fearful that heroin will be diverted from the pharmacy
to the street.'
4
The American debate over the medicinal use of heroin has raged for over
sixty years, but its current focus is more refined than ever before: Should
heroin be available in hospital and hospice pharmacies to provide analgesic
alternatives for patients experiencing severe pain from terminal cancer?' 5 It
is estimated that eight thousand to forty thousand Americans suffer every
year from pain so profound that no currently available medication is effec-
tive. 1 6 For them, the modem link between cancer and heroin may be the
7. Shapiro, supra note 5, at 56.
8. S. TREBACH, THE HEROIN SOLUTION 81 (1982).
9. Note, Medical Necessity as a Defense to Criminal Liability: United States v. Randall.
46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273 (1978).
10. The Controlled Substances Act of 1970 establishes criteria for five separate schedules
of controlled substances. Schedule I imposes the most severe controls; Schedule V, the least
restrictive. Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (1982).
11. Hearings, supra note 1, at 454. (statement of Edward N. Brandt, Jr., M.D.).
12. Hearings, supra note 1, at 454. (statements of Edward N. Brandt, Jr., M.D., and
Kathleen M. Foley, M.D.).
13. Hearings, supra note 1, at 560, 599 (statement of Kathleen Foley, M.D.).
14. Letter from Joseph A. Oddis to Congress, (May 16, 1984) (voicing opposition to H.R.
5290, amended bill to legalize heroin for therapeutic purposes.) See also Neal, supra note 5, at
84-88.
15. H.R. 5290 was amended to provide heroin only to terminally ill patients.
16. J. Quattlebaum, Dying in Agony in America (March 25, 1983) (Paper presented at the
College of Physicians and Surgeons, Columbia University, N.Y.C.).
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avenue to relief. For others, the cancer-heroin association ironically pairs
America's most feared disease with its most feared drug of abuse.
Because the heroin dilemma strikes a nerve in the American public, the
legalization of heroin for therapeutic purposes has become a focal point in
the lay press"' as well as for legal and medical experts. Americans are
acutely aware that one of every four people will be afflicted with some form
of cancer during his lifetime and that nearly everyone will be affected by the
impact of the disease on family members or friends. In this context, congres-
sional initiatives to legalize heroin for specific therapeutic purposes have
sparked greater public interest than similar bills in the past. The Compas-
sionate Pain Relief Act was, however, defeated during the closing days of the
98th Congress.18
This note will demonstrate a two-pronged approach to the legalization of
heroin for therapeutic purposes. The first approach requires a more
favorable judicial interpretation of the right of privacy as inclusive of the
medical choice to take unauthorized or illicit drugs to alleviate intractable
pain in dying patients. Parallels to the laetrile controversy offer guidance as
to how heroin will fare in the courts: the choice to elect heroin therapy as a
function of the right of privacy is likely to fall victim to compelling state
interests. Still, the right of privacy is the best judicial ground upon which to
establish a basis and seek future inroads.
The second and more promising approach is through congressional ac-
tion. Public policy demands that all available effective cancer treatments be
part of the physician's armamentarium to fight the disease. Congress can
bypass the administrative logjam of the FDA's "new drug" procedures and
provide for limited access for those patients whose conditions justify the use
of heroin.
Furthermore, this note will trace the history of heroin's prohibition in this
country and the medical issues at stake in the current controversy. It will
proceed to explore the constitutional basis for legalizing heroin on a limited
basis. Finally, it will focus on congressional efforts to provide a compassion-
ate response to a profoundly human dilemma and conclude that the advo-
cates of heroin's medical use still face major obstacles in their efforts to gain
limited legal status for the controversial drug.
17. Editorials favoring legislation have appeared in newspapers across the country. See,
e.g., St. Paul Pioneer Press, May 13, 1984, at 2B, col. 1; Ft. Lauderdale News, May 4, 1984, at
18A, col. 1; San Jose Mercury News, Apr. 9, 1984, at 6B, col. 1; The Washington Post, Mar.
26, 1984, at 18, col. 1.
18. The bill was defeated by a vote of 355 to 55 on September 19, 1984. 130 CONG. REC.
9791 (1984)
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THE HISTORY
In 1914, the Harrison Narcotics Act banned the recreational use of heroin
in the United States in conjunction with an international initiative to stem
the growing number of opium addicts.' 9 While the Act specifically prohib-
ited the recreational use of the drug, it left the door open for the prescription
of heroin by doctors "in good faith" and "in the legitimate practice of (the)
profession."20
The physician's right to prescribe heroin, however, was soon proscribed
by two significant Supreme Court decisions. In 1918, the Court held in
Webb v. United States2' that it was never appropriate for a doctor to pre-
scribe heroin to addicts. In United States v. Behrman,22 four years later,
doctors were held strictly liable for prescriptions which "could only result in
the gratification of a diseased appetite for those pernicious drugs.",23 While
the statute in question in Behrman specifically excluded physicians from its
prohibition against drug dealing, the government charged "facts sufficient to
show that the accused was not within the exception. ,24 The Court con-
cluded that the defendant physician was in violation of the Act because he
indiscriminately prescribed the drug to a known addict.
In 1924, the House Ways and Means Committee held hearings to amend
the Harrison Act, whose intent was to further restrict the importation of
opium for exclusively medicinal purposes.25 Public concern about growing
addiction problems and criminal conduct associated with the drug fanned
the furor in favor of the simply worded amendment: "Provided, that no
crude opium may be imported for the purpose of manufacturing heroin." 26
Testimony from the American Medical Association (AMA) and the then
United States Surgeon General illustrated the low regard into which heroin
had fallen. The Surgeon General alleged that the drug erased all moral sense
while the physician speaking for the AMA indicated that codeine was a good
substitute for heroin.27 In short, the medical testimony was more sensa-
19. NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON THE TREATMENT OF INTRACTABLE PAIN, Authorizing
the Medical Prescription of Heroin for Terminal Cancer Patients Under Controlled Circum-
stances 1-3 (1979).
20. Hearings, supra note 1, at 3 (statement of Arnold Trebach, J.D., Ph.D.).
21. Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96 (1918).
22. United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922).
23. Id. at 289.
24. Id. at 287.
25. Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, on
H.R. 7079, A Bill Prohibiting the Importation of Crude Opium for the Purpose of Manufactur-
ing Heroin, 68th Congress, Ist Sess. (1924).
26. Id. at 1.
27. Id. at 32, 13.
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tional than it was substantive2 and the ban on heroin reflected its growing
disrepute in the medical community.
The diversion question was also confused by the emotion and tenor of the
testimony. While evidence was introduced that, of ten thousand addicts in
New York State, only two per cent could trace their addiction to medical
treatment, the momentum to outlaw all heroin use was underway. Testi-
mony that seventy-six thousand ounces of heroin were sold on New York's
black market, while only fifty-eight ounces were prescribed by all of the phy-
sicians in the state during the same period, was disregarded by those calling
for the complete abolition of the drug.
29
One commentator has suggested that the 1924 hearings were a miscar-
riage of justice resulting in a deprivation of due process for many Americans
from that time until the present. In testimony before the House Subcommit-
tee on Health and the Environment in 1984, Arnold Trebach, author of The
Heroin Solution, said of the early hearings, "No original or empirical evi-
dence was introduced to demonstrate that there was a connection between
the creation of addicts and the presence of this drug in medical practice. ,30
In 1970, Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act which repealed the Harrison Narcotics Act and provided a new
framework of drug enforcement. Title II of the new Act mandated the es-
tablishment of five schedules of drugs based on degree of abuse potential,
known effects, harmfulness, and level of accepted medical use.3 ' Heroin was
classified in Schedule I, the most restrictive category, and has remained there
despite congressional attempts to reschedule it to allow more latitude in test-
ing and medical use.3 2
Schedule I criteria are identified as follows:
1. The drug or other substance has a high potential for abuse.
2. The drug or other substance has no currently accepted med-
ical use in treatment in the United States.
3. A lack of accepted safety precautions for use of the drug or
other substance under medical supervision. 3
During the 1980 hearings by the House Select Committee on Narcotics
28. Id. See also Hearings; supra note 1, at 571 (statement of Arnold Trebach, J.D.,
Ph.D.).
29. Hearings, supra note 1, at 571.
30. Hearings, supra note 1, at 572 (statement of Arnold Trebach, J.D., Ph.D.). See also
A. TREBACH, THE HEROIN SOLUTION (1982).
31. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (1982).
32. Legislation in the 97th Congress (H.R. 2642) focused on re-scheduling heroin, rather
than establishing a government administered program such as proposed in the latest heroin
legislation.
33. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.§ 801 (1982).
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Abuse and Control, the scheduling dilemma of substances such as heroin
and specifically marijuana (also Schedule I) was dramatized in a dialogue
between Congressman Stephen Neal and a panel of cancer researchers:
Mr. Neal: Well, just for the record, it's my understanding...
that the assumption for a drug to be in Schedule I is
that it has no medical use. And just for the record, I
want to make it clear that you all, the three of you,
are saying there are very definite medical uses for
these substances.
Dr. Sallan: Most definitely.
Dr. Garb: Sir, I would add there are a lot more than three of us
Mr. Neal: Well, now, would you say this about THC only, or
about THC and marijuana?
Dr. Sallan: I would say it about both, but I have much less cer-
tainty about marijuana because it doesn't have the
same scientific rigor in the study at this time.
Mr. Neal: Well, then, we need more study, but to get the study,
we need a substance available to you to study, but as
long as it's under Schedule I, it will not be available,
because the assumption will be that there is no medi-
cal use. It's a Catch-22 situation, it seems to me.
3 4
While Congressman Neal fairly characterized the "no medical use" irony,
the United States government did make accommodations for two testing sit-
uations to analyze the effectiveness of heroin in medical use. These two
studies, the Memorial Sloane Kettering Study and the Georgetown Study,
will be discussed in the following section.
The United States experience with heroin contrasts sharply with that of
the United Kingdom. Over ninety-five per cent of all licit heroin is pre-
scribed in England where the drug has been widely used in hospices for pain
control.3 Currently, heroin is used in a 3:7 ration with morphine. Its status
as the medication of choice in severe pain situations has increased over the
decades.36
In addition to England, twenty-six nations specifically allow for medical
34. Report of the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, Health Conse-
quences of Mariuana Abuse: Recent Findings and the Therapeutic Uses of Marjuana and the
Use of Heroin to Reduce Pain, H.R. Rep. 96-2-5, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1980).
35. National Committee on the Treatment of Intractable Pain, supra note 19, at 7-9. See
also Mondzac In Defense of the Reintroduction of Heroin into American Medical Practice and
H.R. 5290--The Compassionate Pain Relief Act, 311 NEw ENG. J. MED. 535 (1984).
36. Hearings supra note 1, at 10 (statement of Arnold Trebach, J.D., Ph.D.).
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channeling of heroin by qualified physicians.37 Eleven more apply the same
restrictions to heroin use as other narcotic analgesics and ten more nations
have given specific government approval to the use of heroin.3" The United
States, however, allows morphine a relatively favorable Schedule II classifi-
cation in spite of its heroin-like narcotic properties while classifying mari-
juana as a Schedule I drug along with heroin. Clearly, the United States
maintains a model of drug control more suited to law enforcement than to
medical concerns. In spite of the positive experience of doctors and patients
in twenty-seven other nations, many American lawmakers, doctors, and citi-
zens still fear that the controlled introduction of heroin into medical practice
would undermine the American system of drug enforcement and implicitly
condone drug production and trafficking on an international scale. 39
THE MEDICAL CONTROVERSY
Pain as a sympton involves at least fifty per cent of cancer victims and
may become a serious management problem for at least fifteen to twenty per
cent of those individuals.' It is this proportion of cancer patients for whom
heroin would provide an essential pain-killing alternative. Dr. William Bea-
ver, who conducted the most recent government-sponsored study of heroin's
therapeutic value at Georgetown Medical Center, noted: "There will be in-
dividual patients who respond better to heroin for reasons we do not under-
stand."'" Since no two analgesics have properties that are identical, patients
with different reactions may tolerate one analgesic and not another. "This
fact alone justifies a variety of alternative drugs available."
42
Comparisons between heroin, morphine, and other analgesics usually
break down into several distinct categories:
1. POTENCY - Heroin is highly potent (2.7 times more potent than mor-
phine) thus allowing smaller doses to be administered to produce
equivalent pain relief. This consideration is extremely important when
administering a drug to patients with wasted muscle mass.43 Those who
oppose heroin's use cite a new strong form of Dilaudid as being equally
37. J. QUATTLEBAUM, INFORMATION ON MEDICAL USES OF HEROIN IN OTHER NA-
TIONS 4 (1983).
38. Id.
39. H.R. 9765, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. 118 (1984).
40. Hearings, supra note 1, at I (statement of William Regelson, M.D.).
41. Hearings, supra note 1, at 4 (statement of Betsy Hague, R.N., M.S.N., quoting Dr.
William Beaver, "Are Synthetic Narcotics Adequate Substitutes for Opium-Derived
Alkaloids?").
42. Id.
43. Satchell, When Heroin is the Right Drug PARADE MAGAZINE, May 16, 1982, at 12.
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effective."
2. ONSET - Heroin's action is rapid and produces relief quicker than
other drugs. Again, critics maintain that more effective pain manage-
ment would offset this advantage.45
3. ATTITUDE - Heroin produces euphoric feelings in most patients
rather than the depression and anxiety that often follow morphine in-
take. Mood elevation differences, however, were not perceived as signifi-
cant in the latest two studies of the drug."
In the Beaver study, conducted at Georgetown University Vincent T.
Lombardi Cancer Research Center, fifty-two patients with incurable cancer
received one injection of heroin and another of morphine to combat pain.
The results indicated heroin to be more potent, more soluble, and faster-
acting.
47
The Sloane Kettering study, conducted by Dr. Raymond Houde, treated
post-operative pain in cancer patients.4" Results indicate that heroin was
about twice as potent as morphine, that it provided a peak effect earlier than
morphine, that doses with equal analgesic effects provided comparable im-
provements in various elements of mood, but that the peak arrived sooner
with heroin. Furthermore, pain relief and mood improvement were less sus-
tained after heroin at equal doses and in the researcher's opinoin, heroin had
no unique advantage for the relief of pain in patients with cancer.49
It is clear that the medical controversy over heroin's therapeutic use
would not exist but for the criminal aspects of heroin's identity. Even its
detractors find that heroin is neither more advantageous nor disadvanta-
geous than other legal alternatives for the relief of pain. Where the issue of
addiction is moot, as in the case of terminally ill patients, unwillingness to
include heroin as a therapeutic option is a reaction to its character as a po-
tentially addicting drug.
According to oncologist Allen Mondzac, "With each patient, there is a
potential for using up all of the existing drugs."5 The availability of heroin
44. See supra note 12.
45. AM. MED. NEWS, Mar 23, 1984, at 20, col. 3.
46. Id
47. Dr. Beaver commented, "[t]here's no point in doing more research. In fact, we knew
pretty much before we started this study what we would find out." Supra note 43, at 12.
48. There has been disagreement in the medical community over the validity of compari-
sons between post-operative patients, as in the Houde study, and those suffering chronic cancer
pain, as in the Beaver study. It is the chronic and terminally ill sufferers for whom the legali-
zation effort is being waged. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 2 (statement of William Regelson,
M.D.).
49. Kalko, Analgesic and Mood Effects of Heroin and Morphine in Cancer Patients with
Postoperative Pain, 34 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1501 (1981).
50. Hearings, supra note 1, at 547. (statement of Allen Mondzac, M.D.).
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would extend the physician's potential pain-killing remedies to one more ef-
fective therapy. Heroin's current outlaw status denies doctors and patients
that alternative.
THE LEGAL ISSUES
The Right to Privacy -- Griswold v. Connecticut
The decision to use heroin to mitigate the agony of cancer pain enjoys no
explicit constitutional protection. The complicated interplay of personal au-
tonomy, illicit drug use, human suffering, and medical necessity creates a
legal paradox that is at once intensely intimate and starkly public in nature.
The question is basic: whether a person's choice to use heroin should be
fundamentally protected against coercion by law."1 The answer lies in the
developing right of privacy which has been held to encompass something
beyond the issues of marital choice, procreation, conception, and child-rear-
ing and to embrace "an interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions. '"52 No decision can be more profound than that im-
plicit in the heroin dilemma.
The right of privacy was first judicially recognized in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut in 1965." Griswold raised the question of whether a married couple
living in Connecticut could be imprisoned for using birth control. Under the
operative state statute, the use of any device to prevent conception was crim-
inal. The Supreme Court struck down the statute, declaring that "marriage
is . . .intimate to the degree of being sacred,"54 and is subject to constitu-
tional protections under a privacy right "older than the Bill of Rights.""
Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority, located substantive protection for
marital intimacy in a "zone of privacy" created by several fundamental
guarantees emanating from penumbras of the first, third, fourth, fifth, and
ninth amendments.
5 6
Justice Goldberg's Griswold concurrence identified the source of the pri-
vacy right in the ninth amendment and defined a test to determine whether a
fundamental right worthy of constitutional protection- exists. He directed
judges to look to the "collective conscience of the people" to find whether a
principle is so firmly rooted as to be ranked fundamental. The inquiry ex-
plored whether the right involved is of such a character that it cannot be
51. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 892 (1977).
52. Id. at 886.
53. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
54. Id. at 486.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 485.
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denied without violating those "fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all of our civil and political institutions."57 With the
same breadth of philosophical conviction, Justice Harlan located the privacy
right among those "basic values implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"8
and suggested a fourteenth amendment due process analysis to determine
whether such a right has been violated.
The Griswold Court concluded that a married couple's right to use contra-
ceptives is fundamental and protected by the constitutional right of privacy,
however abstract and circuitous the route to that protection. Seven years
later, the same right was extended to unmarried persons in Eisenstadt v.
Baird.
5 9
As the court construes the right to privacy, its decisions rest on a recogni-
tion of values implicit in our way of life and philosphy as a nation, rather
than on any strict construction of a concept. The celebrated Brandeis state-
ment in Olmstead v. United States' conveyed the tone that would underlie
so many future decisions:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the signifi-
cance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and his intellect.
They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions
of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and sen-
sations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to
be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men.
61
The distance between the subjective recognition of collective and natural
values and a concrete source for the protection of those values led the Gris-
wold Court to explore several constitutional constructions. It is that same
distance, still untraveled, that deprives the current heroin issue of a humane
solution.
Development of the Right of Privacy
The evolution of the privacy right continued in the famous "abortion
cases" of 1973: Roe v. Wade62 and Doe v. Bolton.63 In Roe, the Court con-
57. Id. at 493.
58. Id. at 500.
59. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
60. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
61. Id at 478 (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
62. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
63. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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cluded that the right to personal privacy includes the right to an abortion
but that "this right is not unqualified and must be considered against impor-
tant state interest in regulation."" The balancing test of a fundamental
right versus a compelling state interest became the hallmark of personal
health and privacy decisions in the courts. In his Roe concurrence, Justice
Douglas explicitly includes within the term "liberty" in the Fourteenth
Amendement "the freedom to care for one's own health and person . . .
subject to regulation on a showing of 'compelling state interest'.,"65 His ob-
servation is a forerunner of the complex health and enforcement questions
that characterize the heroin dilemma today.
The balancing test of Roe v. Wade is operative in Whalen v. Roe66 four
years later. Whalen clearly establishes the state's right to regulate dangerous
drugs in the face of individual privacy interests. The Court upheld a New
York statute requiring the registration of all medical prescriptions for addic-
tive drugs to control abuse. The Court distinguished the state's interest in
record keeping from the individual's right to decide what drugs to take:
"within dosage limits. . . the decision to prescribe, or to use, is left entirely
to the physician and the patient.",67 Yet, while acknowledging the "individ-
ual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters,"6 the Court nonethe-
less upheld the right of the state to maintain the names of those selecting
certain substances. In the view of the Court, the state's interest in record-
keeping, while compelling disclosure, was justified and fell short of invading
an individual's liberty right.69 Thus, the Court recognized relative levels of
intrusion into personal decision-making, further emphasizing the less than
absolute nature of the fundamental right of privacy.
Choice of Treatment
The choice of treatment as an element of the right of privacy may be con-
sidered in three separate contexts. The first is the right to choose from
among approved methods of treatment, a well-established legal right which
threatens no state interest and implies informed consent on the part of the
patient.
The right to refuse treatment is the second and more complex issue. It
was tested as early as 1904 when a man named Jacobsen refused a smallpox
vaccination on the basis of every man's right to control the sanctity of his
64. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154-55.
65. Id.
66. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
67. Id. at 603.
68. Id at 599.
69. Id. at 598-606.
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body.70 The Court held that the state's interest in preventing the spread of
disease overrode Jacobsen's personal right to refuse treatment. The Court
implied that the right to refuse treatment would be upheld only when the
individual's choice is informed, and society's interest would not be harmed.
In In re Quinlan,"' the court's focus was limited to the right to decline
life-prolonging treatment when the patient had no realistic hope of returning
to "any semblance of cognitive or sapient life.' 72 The issue was further com-
plicated by the patient's comatose state and her subsequent inability to rep-
resent her own interests before the court. The court held that her father
could decide to cease life-prolonging activity in order to safeguard her right
to die with dignity. 73 The constitutional law commentator Laurence Tribe
pointed out the inherent irony in the court's decision: that given the vegeta-
tive state that alone justified the court's holding, "attributing 'rights' to the
patient at all was problematic.",74 The decision more realistically concerned
the desires of parents and society to allow freedom of medical decision-mak-
ing when individuals without consciousness linger only through extraordi-
nary life-prolonging means.7- The Quinlan case did not confer the right to
terminate care to those who are conscious and for whom death is not immi-
nent. In effect, the court recognized that a balancing of state and individual
interests in the context of life-prolonging medical care is affected by the de-
gree of illness suffered by the victim and the fading hope of a cure.76
The third choice of treatment situation - the right to choose a medical
treatment that is not approved by the state - has led to a number of deci-
sions §urrounding the drug laetrile77 and has loomed at the center of the
marijuana~controversy. 78 Judicial resolution of this third category of deci-
sion-making may well determine the future of heroin as a therapeutic agent.
The leading case in the area is Rutherford v. United States.
79
70. Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1904).
71. In Re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
72. Id at 39, 355 A.2d at 663.
73. Id. at 41-42, 335 A.2d at 664.
74. See supra note 51, at 936.
75. Id.
76. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
77. Several law review articles focus on the laetrile controversy and provide insight into
choice of treatment questions. See Comment, The Uncertain Application of the Right of Pri-
vacy in Personal Medical Decisions: The Laetrile Cases, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 523 (1981); Note,
The Right of Privacy Does Not Include the Right to Laetrile, 2 WHIrrIER L. REV. 599 (1980);
Note, Regulating Laetrile: Constitutional and Statutory Implications, 5 U. DAYTON L. REV.
155 (1980); Leitner, Laetrile and the Law: An Analysis of Rutherford v. United States, 5 OKLA.
CITY L. REV. 11 (1980).
78. Cooper, Therapeutic Use of Marihuana and Heroin: The Legal Framework, 35 FOOD
DRUG CosM. L.J. 68 (1980).
79. Rutherford v. United States has the following judicial history: Rutherford v. United
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Rutherford v. United States
In Rutherford, several terminally-ill cancer patients sued to enjoin the
United States from interfering with their access to laetrile. The United
States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma issued an injunc-
tion against the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) on the basis that
patients were denied freedom of choice and were deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.' The court held that the FDA's li-
censing requirements for new drugs made it virtually impossible for laetrile
to become legally accessible.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
looked closely at FDA procedures and focused on the approval process for
"new" drugs and the grandfather clause exemptions under the Food and
Drug Act. Its inquiry raised the following questions: 1) Was laetrile mar-
keted on October 9, 1962, as a cancer drug and was it then generally recog-
nized as safe? 2) Was laetrile recognized or used as a cancer drug under the
same conditions of present use during the period when the Food and Drug
Act of 1906 was in effect from June of 1906 until June of 1938?"1 If either
question could be answered affirmatively, laetrile would be exempt under the
grandfather clause.8 2
The tenth circuit remanded the case to the Food and Drug Administra-
tion in order to produce an administrative record supporting its determina-
tion that laetrile was a "new" drug, though it did not explore the
constitutionality of the "new" drug procedures. In 1977, in response to the
court's order, the FDA released its findings that laetrile was not generally
recognized as safe and effective or exempt under the 1962 grandfather
clause.
On appeal, the district court ruled that the FDA's classification of laetrile
as a "new" drug was "arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, and,
States, 399 F. Supp. 1208 (W.D. Okla. 1975) (remanding to the FDA), affid, 542 F.2d 1137
(10th Cir. 1976) (affirming the district court's remand to the FDA), 424 F. Supp. 105 (W.D.
Okla. 1977) (remanding to the FDA), 429 F. Supp. 506 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (again remanding
to the FDA and enjoining the FDA from interfering with importation and use of laetrile by
plaintiffs), 438 F. Supp. 1287 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (again remanding to FDA and enjoining
FDA from interference with plaintiff's use), aftd 582 F.2d 1234 (10th Cir. 1978) (affirming
the district court's remand to and injunction of FDA), rev'd, 442 U.S. 544 (1979) (reversing
and remanding to court of appeals), 616 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1980) (remanding to district court
to reverse injunction against FDA), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 937 (1980).
80. 399 F. Supp. 1208 (W.D. Okla. 1975), affid and remanded, 542 F.2d 1137 (10th Cir.
1976).
81. 542 F.2d 1137, 1142 (10th Cir. 1976).
82. 42 Fed. Reg. 39 (1977).
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as a matter of law, unsupportable., 8 3 The judges noted that laetrile had
been used and sold commercially in the United States for over twenty-five
years and had been generally recognized as safe."
As to the constitutional aspects, the court looked to the "abortion cases""
for the premise that a right of privacy exists under the Constitution. As
Douglas said in Doe, "that right has no more conspicuous place than in the
physician-patient relationship."8 6 The district court determined that funda-
mental civil liberties were at issue in Rutherford, and that the choice to use
laetrile, regardless of its correctness, should be the sole prerogative of the
person whose body was being ravaged by disease.8 7
Again, the United States appealed the decision of the district court to the
tenth circuit which sustained the district court's injunction, thus allowing
the interstate sale and use of laetrile for terminally ill patients to continue.88
The appeals court did not directly address the constitutional issue. On ap-
peal to the Supreme Court, the tenth circuit was reversed and the case re-
manded for further proceedings on those issues.
8 9
In its opinion, the Supreme Court dealt with the relationship between the
FDA's protective procedures and terminally ill patients. The Court held
that the Congress could reasonably have intended to shield terminal patients
from ineffectual or unsafe drugs, and that any other interpretation of the
FDA regulations would substitute the opinion of the Court for that of Con-
gress. "For the terminally ill, as for anyone else, a drug is unsafe if its poten-
tial for inflicting death or physical injury is not offset by the possibility of
therapeutic benefit."'  The Supreme Court did not address the privacy
issue.
On remand, the Tenth Circuit revived the balancing test to weigh the
"protected right" to select a medical treatment against the governmental in-
terest in. protecting public health. The court found that the state's interest
outweighed such personal medical decisions. The constitutional conflict was
thus temporarily resolved.9'
Rutherford represents a weakening of the individual's privacy interest in
choosing medical treatment. Unlike the early Jacobsen case,92 no public
83. 438 F. Supp. at 1295.
84. Id.
85. See supra notes 56-57.
86. 410 U.S. 179, 208, (1973).
87. 438 F. Supp. at 1300.
88. 582 F.2d 1234 (10th Cir. 1978).
89. 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
90. Id. at 556.
91. 616 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1980).
92. See supra note 70.
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danger existed in granting laetrile's commerce. Unlike the "abortion deci-
sions," other lives would not be affected by an individual's choice of treat-
ment. Only victims of cancer themselves would be affected by the
prohibition on laetrile's use. The compelling state interest could be con-
strued only as protecting terminally ill patients from their own informed
choice. Thus, while it has been held that an individual can refuse treatment
to sustain life, he is not yet free to select an unauthorized treatment in the
face of death.
People v. Privatera
People v. Privatera," a California Supreme Court decision, reaches the
same conclusion. The California court determined that the right to use lae-
trile is not governed by the fundamental right of privacy because it is not
among those decisions enumerated in the "privacy cases."94 As such, the
court had only to find a rational basis for the statute proscribing laetrile's
use, which it fulfilled by citing a history of misleading representations about
cancer cures.
In a dissent more remarkable than the decision, Chief Justice Rose Bird
assserted that "choice of treatment is one of the most important decisions a
person may ever make, touching intimately on his or her being."95 Her
opinion and that of the district court in Rutherford represent the eloquent
dissent in a line of decisions that subordinate the individual's freedom of
choice in medical decisions to the state's perceived goals.
Thus, the prevailing tone of judicial decisions leads to negative assump-
tions about the future of heroin therapy via the judiciary. Because heroin's
status is not just unauthorized, but forbidden, the recognition of a funda-
mental right to use the drug for medical reasons would conflict with the
state's interest in prohibiting its existence on nearly every occasion. Only a
contention that the current prohibition is overbroad would prevent the
state's interest from outweighing every personal consideration.
The Marijuana Connection
"It isn't absolutely necessary to be a masochist to do research on mari-
juana today, but it certainly helps."
'96
Marijuana, like heroin, is a Schedule I drug. Under federal law, it is
93. People v. Privatera, 23 Cal. 3d 697, 591 P.2d 919, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1979), cert.
denied 444 U.S. 949 (1979).
94. The court referred to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child
rearing, and education. 23 Cal. 3d at 702, 591 P.2d at 922, 153 Cal Rptr. at 434.
95. 23 Cal. 3d at 711, 591 P.2d at 927, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 439 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
96. Cohen, Marijuana as Medicine, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Apr, 1978, at 60.
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deemed to have no medical usefulness while having high potential for
abuse."' It is subject to the following restrictions:
* The DEA has established quotas on lawful production of mari-
juana and its active ingredient THC.
* The drug may be manufactured only by an individual or com-
pany registered with the DEA.
* A researcher seeking to study the drug must obtain registration
from the DEA.
* The drug must be kept in a vault.
* Record keeping is required.
* Trafficking the drug is a felony.
* The drug is available for research only and may not be
prescribed.98
In addition, marijuana falls under FDA's "new drug" category and is sub-
ject to its regulatory provisions.
Marijuana and THC are currently being tested for their ability to relieve
pain, insomnia, anxiety, asthma, epilepsy, glaucoma, and the side-effects of
chemotherapy. 99 In addition, the National Cancer Institute's Division of
Cancer Treatment now provides THC to physicians for use in controlled
situations. As such, the Schedule I classification has become a contradiction
in terms. The proven medical uses for marijuana are growing every day.
Hearings in Congress have focused on the subject of down-scheduling ma-
rijuana to conform with current knowledge about the drug's effectiveness. "
Marijuana progress bears watching by advocates of heroin's legalization.
While the public's response to marijuana continues to be volatile, public fear
is less profound than with the use of heroin and the potential beneficiaries of
therapeutic marijuana use are more numerous. Nevertheless, according to
former FDA Chief Counsel Richard Cooper,
[t]he medical future of both THC and heroin is not entirely clear
A potential manufacturer will have to gather the relevant
data and organize them into new drug applications that meet the
FDA standards. It may turn out that the biggest obstacle to the
therapeutic use of marijuana and heroin is the lack of interest in
the drug on the part of drug companies.'
0 '
97. Ironically, severe dependence liability is a criterion for Schedule II and not Schedule
I.
98. Cooper, supra note 78, at 70.
99. Cohen, supra note 96, at 60.
100. Marijuana Therapy, 21 MED. WORLD NEws 39 (Apr. 28, 1980). See also Randall,
Medical Uses of Marijuana: Pending Legislation and Review of the Literature, Congressional
Research Service (1982).
101. Cooper, supra note 78, at 82.
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Medical Necessity Defense
Federal courts have consistently held that possession and sale of mari-
juana are not protected by the right to privacy.' 2 However, the common
law defense of necessity has been held to extend to medical necessity in the
case of a Washington, D.C., man who used marijuana to treat his deteriorat-
ing glaucoma condition. 3
. In 1975, Bob Randall was arrested and charged with unlawful possession
of marijuana. He sought acquittal on the strength of a medical necessity
defense. The District of Columbia Superior Court dismissed the charge,
stating that a person whose use of marijuana is a matter of medical necessity
is not criminally liable for its unlawful possession." While the necessity
defense historically depended on an immediate threat to life, a fear of deteri-
orating health was later considered to be a justifiable ground for the
defense. 1O5
The court stated that "necessity is the conscious, rational act of one who is
not guided by his own free will. It arises from a determination by the indi-
vidual that any reasonable man in his situation would find the personal con-
sequences of violating the law less severe than the consequences of
compliance."" ° The court noted that the defense is not available to one who
has brought the circumstances upon himself." 7 Thus, a heroin addict who
would argue the defense of necessity would be unlikely to prevail.108 In ad-
dition, if there was a less stringent alternative, the defense would fall." 9 Fi-
nally, the harm avoided must be more serious than what is performed to
escape it. lO
The D.C. court's analysis focused on a balancing of interests between
Randall's desire to preserve his sight and the government's interest in main-
102. For survey of federal court decisions on the subject, see Leary v. United States, 544
F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Horsley, 519 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1975), cert de-
nied, 424 U.S. 944 (1976); United States v. Kiefer, 477 F.2d 349 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 831 (1973).
103. United States v. Randall, 104 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2249 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Nov. 24,
1976). Randall's use of marijuana to treat glaucoma foreshadowed an important medical po-
tential for the drug. Experiments to determine the therapeutic value of marijuana in reducing
the intraocular pressure in glaucoma have produced encouraging results. Council on Scien-
tific Affairs, Marijuana: Its Health Hazard and Therapeutic Potentia 16 J.A.M.A. 246 (1981)
104. Randall, 104 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 2254.
105. For a discussion of the medical necessity defense, see Note, Medical Necessity as a
Defense to Criminal Liability: United States v. Randall, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273 (1978).
106. 104 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 2249-51.
107. Id. at 2252.
108. United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
109. 104 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 2252.
110. Id
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taining its regulation of marijuana. Noting "how far-reaching is the right of
an individual to preserve his health and bodily integrity," ' the court con-
cluded that blindness is a greater evil than breaking the prohibition on mari-
juana. In dismissing the case, the court also noted that no innocent party
was injured and Randall had not brought his condition upon himself. The
United States did not appeal.
The court's acceptance of Randall's defense is significant as a qualified
affirmation of the right to protect one's health. Within the context of the
case, an analogy between the use of marijuana and the use of heroin is a
logical one. If the only means to combat intractable pain is heroin, then the
medical necessity defense successfully employed by Randall might prevail
for one who breaks the prohibition on heroin due to an advanced condition
of cancer. However, the defense is limited to individuals caught in the medi-
cal-legal bind. It is no answer to the larger question of legalization that must
be confronted by lawmakers if any true progress is to take place.
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
While the courts have only addressed the heroin conflict by implication,
Congress has squarely dealt with the issue. The Compassionate Pain Relief
Act, H.R. 5290, was designed to establish a temporary program under which
"parenteral diacetylmorphine (heroin) would be made available through
qualified pharmacies for the relief of intractable pain due to cancer."'112 The
bill was introduced by Congressman Henry Waxman of California, Chair-
man of the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the Committee
on Energy and Commerce. It was defeated by a vote of 355 to 55 on Sep-
tember 19, 1984, after several hours of passionate debate.' 13 According to
Congressman Waxman, the lopsided vote was a consequence of political
timing:
"People were afraid to vote in any way, shape or form for anything that
sounded like legalization of heroin. They were afraid they would be cam-
paigned against on the issue."
'1 14
H.R. 5290 was not the first congressional attempt to deal with the availa-
bility of heroin for therapeutic purposes. In 1980, Congressmen Waxman of
California and Congressman Madigan of Illinois jointly and separately intro-
duced legislation to make heroin available on a limited basis. Hearings were
111. Id. at 2253.
112. H.R. 5290, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984). See H.R. Rep. No. 98-689, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1, 2 (1984).
113. 130 CONG. REC. 118, H. 9791 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1984).
114. The Washington Post, Sept. 20, 1984, at 3A, col. 4.
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held before the Subcommitee on Health and the Environment of the Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce Committee.11 Again in 1983, Waxman intro-
duced legislation which was the subject of more hearings and was
subsequently reintroduced as the clear bill which the House defeated in Sep-
tember, 1984. Its Senate companion, S. 209, was introduced by Senator In-
ouye of Hawaii and never reached a vote on the Senate floor.
The Waxman bill was a model of qualified legalization. H.R. 5290 would
have required the Secretary of Health and Human Services to establish a
temporary four-year research program during which heroin would be pro-
vided to terminally ill cancer patients through a limited number of pharma-
cies upon the written prescription of a licensed physician. The program
would be monitored by the Government Accounting Office (GAO). An
amendment by Congressman Hughes of New Jersey would have tightened
the bill even further by requiring that the patient for whom heroin is pre-
scribed would not respond to any other available drug, that a physician's
decision to prescribe heroin be reviewed by a medical panel, and that the
program be drawn into the system of regulation of the Controlled Sub-
stances Act. The Hughes Amendment was not passed." 6
The politics of the Compassionate Pain Relief Act were unusual and em-
bittered. The Reagan administration opposed the bill, stating that equally
potent drugs were available and diversion was a real and present danger." 7
The American Medical Association opposed the bill while the American
Nurses' Association favored its passage."' Rhetoric on the House floor vol-
leyed between calls for compassion and warnings of dire consequences if the
bill were to become law." 9 One opposing legislator even suggested that "we
are going to have many pushers telling young kids, 'Look, this (heroin) can-
not be that bad for you. After all, doctors and hospitals are using it all over
the country.' "120
Opponents also decried the fact that H.R. 5290 bypassed the Food and
Drug Administration's "new drug" approval process by providing for gov-
ernment manufacture and distribution of the drug. Advocates maintain that
so few patients are potentially involved that no drug company is likely to
undertake the major effort and expense to meet the FDA regulations, espe-
115. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
116. 130 Cong. Rec. 118, HR 9780-81 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1984).
117. Hearings, supra note 1, at 462.
118. Hearings, supra note 1, at 603.
119. 130 Cong. Rec. 117-118, (daily ed. September 18, 19, 1984).
120. 130 Cong. Rec. 118, H9774 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1984) (statement of Congressman
Walker).
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cially in light of heroin's unsavory reputation.
12 1
It was the criminal identity of heroin and the threat of cross-over from
pharmacy to "street" and from "street" back to the sick and dying that
emerged as the focus of the debate in an election year. Chairman Rangel of
the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control led the opposition
suggesting that "a lot of people. . . would openly advocate that we just take
the profits out of heroin and just start legalizing the entire illicit drug manu-
facturing and transactions in the United States."' 1 2 2 A letter from Secretary
of Health and Human Services Margaret Heckler was quoted, emphasizing
the Reagan administration position that legalization would pose serious pub-
lic safety, enforcement, and security problems and that health care profes-
sionals would be placed in jeopardy by the direct link to criminal activity. 
123
Chairman Dingell of the Energy and Commerce Committee that reported
favorably on the bill disposed of the Adminisration's major objection
metaphorically.
Let us take a little bit of a look at the question of diversion: 4.3
tons of illegal heroin come into this country. That is the equivalent
to two elephants in weight. If you were to take the entire amount
of heroin that is going to be coming into this country under care-
fully controlled conditions to meet the needs of the hopelessly dy-
ing cancer patients, you would probably have the equivalent of a
pimple on the posterior of one of those elephants.1
24
The fact that the illicit heroin supply would not be significantly increased
even in the worst case analysis did not prove persuasive to a majority of
voting members. The debate had an evangelical tenor that had less to do
with facts than with the emotional impact of heroin on the American
psyche. According to one Waxman staffer, the "all-out-attack" waged by
the administration not only helped to create a fervor among the bill's detrac-
tors, but also cost the proponents five months that proved strategically dev-
astating. 125  Allegations that the administration used illegal lobbying
techniques to defeat the bill are now under investigation by the Office of. the
Inspector General.
126
121. Government manufacture of heroin might compete with the marketing of
hydromorphone (trade name "Dilaudid"), a domestic drug. Dilaudid is currently the drug of
choice for the treatment of severe, intractable pain. Although both Dilaudid and heroin are
effective analgesics, the controversy centers on the availability of heroin for use in those cases
where Dilaudid has proved ineffective.
122. 130 Cong. Rec. 118, H9765 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1984).
123. Id. at H9764.
124. Id. at H9771.
125. Revealed in a conversation with Health Subcommittee staffers after defeat of the bill.
126. 130 Cong. Rec. 118, H9771-72 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1984). Chairman Dingell placed in
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The lay press rallied behind the Compassionate Pain Relief Act. The
Washington Post headlined its September 22d editorial Cruel Cowardice and
commented that "demagoguery carried the day."' 27 The New York Times
editorialized that Congress preferred symbolic action, "no matter how cruel
the effect on the dying."' 128 Papers from The Fort Lauderdale News to the
San Jose Mercury News had endorsed the measure in weeks and months pre-
ceding the vote. 129 In an acerbic commentary on the subject, Editor Smith
Hempstone of The Washington Times wrote, "[t]he absolute medical ban on
heroin makes about as much sense as denying a man about to be electro-
cuted a cigarette on the grounds that the Surgeon General has determined
smoking is injurious to the health."'
130
Proponents of the Compassionate Pain Relief Act are hopeful that more
favorable timing, public support, and an off-election year will improve pros-
pects for the bill's passage during the 99th Congress.'
3'
CONCLUSION
The forty-thousand Americans who could benefit today from heroin's le-
galization cannot afford to wait for a broader judicial interpretation of the
right to privacy. Even as the courts affirm the fundamental nature of deci-
sions affecting one's health and well-being, they qualify the conditions and
circumstances under which these decisions may be made. The strict scrutiny
accorded to fundamental-right analyses seems more easily satisfied in the
privacy context than where other fundamental rights are concerned: the bal-
ancing test is slanted toward compelling state interest. The persistent judi-
cial perception that the state's interest in drug regulation overrides
individual fundamental rights assures that courts will continue to defer to
the authority of the FDA and DEA in the scheduling and control of heroin's
use in this country.
Only a re-evaluation of the government's interest could alter this judicial
posture. A closer look at the actual dangers of heroin's diversion from phar-
macy to street use would reveal an exaggerated fear of expanded illicit trade.
A recognition that the addictive potential of heroin is no issue for the dying
would undermine the contention that its use is deleterious to the target pop-
the record letters to regional Health and Human Resources directors explaining how to con-
tribute to the defeat of H.R. 5290.
127. The Washington Post, Sept. 22, 1984, at A-22, col. 1.
128. The New York Times, Sept. 27, 1984, at A-22, col. 1.
129. San Jose Mercury News, Apr. 9, 1984, at 6B, col. l; Ft. Lauderdale News, May 4,
1984, at 18A, col.l.
130. The Washington Times, March 28, 1984, at 1c, 2c, col. 1.
131. Conversation with Health Subcommittee staffers following bill's defeat.
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ulation. But the courts will not re-define the nature of the government's
interest in the sweeping prohibition on heroin. The judicial system will not
substitute its judgment for the will of Congress so clearly demonstrated in 60
years of legislative history.
The only imminent hope for cancer victims lies with the Congress and not
the courts. The dramatic defeat of the Compassionate Pain Relief Act of
1984 is a major setback which, according to Judith Quattlebaum of the Na-
tional Committee on the Treatment of Intractable Pain, is "impossible to
explain to cancer patients." 132 Congressional advocates have, however, re-
introduced the measure in the 99th Congress with an eye toward more ad-
vantageous timing.'
33
It is time for Congress to mitigate the law enforcement message of the past
decades and offer a new perception of a compassionate, balanced, and hope-
ful drug policy for this nation. The quality of American lives depends on it.
Suzanne Marcus Stoll
132. Phone conversation with Judith Quattlebaum following defeat of H.R. 5290, October,
1984.
133. Senator Inouye of Hawaii has introduced the bill on the Senate side while Congress-
man Waxman of California will introduce a companion bill on the House side shortly. CONG.
REc. Jan 3, 1985, Part II. Conversation with Joanne Leety, Administrative Assistant to Sena-
tor Inouye, March 1, 1985.
